MyIPScan

Independent self-test

iCloud Private Relay Leak Test

Apple documents Private Relay in terms narrow enough to change what a leak test means. It covers web browsing in Safari, DNS resolution queries and insecure HTTP traffic, and sends requests through two separate relays run by different parties so that no single one of them, Apple included, holds the whole picture. The address presented is chosen to represent your city accurately by default. None of that describes a device-wide tunnel, and readings should be taken with that in mind.

Read methodology

Live test

Run the test on iCloud Private Relay now

Private Relay covers Safari browsing, DNS and insecure HTTP, so a check run in another browser measures your ordinary connection rather than telling you anything about the feature.

Open the full VPN Leak Test

This browser session

Leak report

Not tested
Verdict
Visible IP
Not tested
DNS
Not tested
WebRTC
Not tested
IPv6
Not tested
Browser
Not tested
Next step

This reports what your browser shows in this session. It does not certify iCloud Private Relay, does not test every server, app or device, and does not prove anonymity.

Current-session checks

What this iCloud Private Relay self-test checks

Take a reading in Safari with the feature off and another with it on. Anywhere else on the device the result describes your ordinary connection, because that is the documented scope.

Before you read the result

What iCloud Private Relay documents about these signals

The points below come from Apple's own support and developer documentation describing what Private Relay covers and how it is built.

Safari, DNS and plain HTTP, and nothing else

Apple states that Private Relay protects web browsing in Safari, DNS resolution queries and insecure HTTP application traffic. Traffic from applications that use ordinary encrypted connections of their own is outside it. A reading taken in another browser is therefore an accurate description of your connection and no description at all of this feature.

Two relays, two different operators

Apple describes a multi-hop arrangement in which requests travel through two separate internet relays operated by different entities, so that no single party including Apple can view or collect the details of browsing activity. The first is documented as knowing your address but not the site you are visiting; the second as knowing the site but not your address. From the outside you meet only the second, which is why a lookup on the address you end up with does not obviously point at Apple, and why an unfamiliar network name in the result is the design rather than a symptom.

The address is chosen to match your city

Apple documents the relay address presented to networks and web servers as accurately representing the coarse city-level location of the client by default, so that location-dependent services still work. There is a broader region setting as an alternative. A result that places you near home is the default behaving as described.

This is not a device-wide tunnel

Everything Apple documents about the coverage points the same way: a defined set of traffic rather than everything a device sends. Comparing a reading here with one taken behind a full tunnel compares two different products, and the comparison will mislead in the direction of thinking something has failed.

What a browser check can still settle

Whether the address your browser presented changed between the two readings, which resolver answered, and what WebRTC produced. Those remain useful answers. They are just answers about Safari on this device, rather than about everything the device is doing.

Between the readings

Record a kill-switch drop on iCloud Private Relay

There may be no app to quit here, so force the change the way it happens to you: switch network, or turn the feature off in settings. The recording captures the moment the visible address changes back.

Known leak issues and fixes

How iCloud Private Relay stands against the VPN leak attacks published since 2023, and leak bugs the provider disclosed itself, taken from its own statements and changelogs. Every row links to its source and says when we last read it. Compare every provider side by side.

AttackAppsStatusWhat the provider saidSource
TunnelVisionCVE-2024-3661 All apps Not statedChecked 18 Oct 2026 No Apple statement found in its security releases. support.apple.com advisoryRead 18 Oct 2026
TunnelCrack LocalNetCVE-2023-36672, CVE-2023-35838 All apps Not statedChecked 18 Oct 2026 No Apple statement found in its security releases. support.apple.com advisoryRead 18 Oct 2026
TunnelCrack ServerIPCVE-2023-36673, CVE-2023-36671 All apps Not statedChecked 18 Oct 2026 No Apple statement found in its security releases. support.apple.com advisoryRead 18 Oct 2026
CVE-2022-46716: Private Relay did not match settings iOS, macOS FixedStated 16 Mar 2023Fix: iOS 16.2, macOS Ventura 13.1 Private Relay could behave differently from what the system settings showed. Entry added to Apple's notes on 16 March 2023. support.apple.com advisoryRead 18 Oct 2026
CVE-2023-40385: DNS queries leaked in WebKit iOS, macOS, Browser FixedStated 22 Dec 2023Fix: iOS 17, macOS Sonoma 14, Safari 17 DNS queries could be seen with Private Relay turned on. support.apple.com advisoryRead 18 Oct 2026
CVE-2024-44246: Reading List revealed the IP address iOS, macOS, Browser FixedStated 11 Dec 2024Fix: iOS 18.2, macOS Sequoia 15.2, Safari 18.2 Adding a site to the Safari Reading List could bypass Private Relay. support.apple.com advisoryRead 18 Oct 2026
CVE-2025-43276: Private Relay off with several users logged in macOS FixedStated 29 Jul 2025Fix: macOS Sequoia 15.6 Private Relay could fail to switch on when more than one user was logged in. support.apple.com advisoryRead 18 Oct 2026
CVE-2025-43376: DNS queries leaked in WebKit iOS, macOS, Browser FixedStated 3 Nov 2025Fix: iOS 26, macOS Tahoe 26, Safari 26 DNS queries could be seen with Private Relay turned on. Entry added 3 November 2025. support.apple.com advisoryRead 18 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-65355 and CVE-2026-65352: IP address disclosed iOS, macOS FixedStated 14 Sep 2026Fix: iOS 26.6.1, macOS Tahoe 26.6.2 Issues in Authentication Services and WebKit let a site learn the user's IP address with Private Relay on. support.apple.com advisoryRead 18 Oct 2026

These are the provider's published statements, not tests we ran. The leak test on this page checks your own connection; these attacks need a hostile local network and cannot be reproduced from a web page.

Published audits

No published independent audit found as of 19 Oct 2026. Apple's Private Relay support page describes the design but names no independent audit. support.apple.comChecked 19 Oct 2026 All published VPN audits we track.

Who runs iCloud Private Relay, and on what

Company
Apple Inc., United States. The contracting entity for iCloud+ in the US; other regions use local Apple companies. apple.comRead 18 Oct 2026

Who owns which VPN: every provider’s company and the groups that run several brands.

What this cannot prove

  • This checks visible browser/session signals only.
  • This does not certify the provider.
  • This does not test every server, app, device, or connection.
  • This does not prove anonymity.
  • This does not prove every security condition.
  • A clean result does not prove every leak is absent.

How to compare before and after on iCloud Private Relay

  1. Take a reading in Safari with Private Relay switched off.
  2. Switch it on and let the setting take effect before testing again.
  3. Repeat the checks in Safari, not in another browser.
  4. Expect the location to stay close to your city, since that is the documented default.
Safe Copy limits

Safe Copy exports use safe summary categories and remove raw IP, exact city, full user-agent, raw fingerprint data, raw resolver IPs and WebRTC candidates. It is not a certificate, provider audit, or proof of anonymity.

FAQ

iCloud Private Relay leak test FAQ

What traffic does Private Relay cover?

Apple documents it as protecting web browsing in Safari, DNS resolution queries and insecure HTTP application traffic. Other application traffic is outside that scope.

Why does my location still look right?

Apple describes the relay address as accurately representing the coarse city-level location of the client by default, with a broader region setting available. A nearby location is the default working as documented.

Who can see my address?

Apple describes two relays run by different entities, arranged so no single party including Apple can view or collect the details of browsing activity. The first knows your address, the second knows the destination.

Should I test this from Chrome or Firefox?

No. The documented coverage is Safari browsing along with DNS and insecure HTTP. A reading from another browser will describe your ordinary connection and settle nothing about the feature.

Is this the same as a VPN?

Apple documents a defined set of traffic rather than a device-wide tunnel, so the two are not interchangeable. Reading a result here as if it came from a full tunnel is the usual source of confusion.

Can this page confirm which relay served me?

No. It reports what your browser exposed to this site. The internal arrangement between the two relays is not observable from a web page, and nothing here should be read as describing it.